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A B S T R A C T
Background: Central banks set economy-wide interest rates to meet exclusively economic objectives. There is a
strong link between indebtedness and psychiatric morbidity at the individual level, with interest rates being an
important factor determining ability to repay debt. However, no prior research has explored whether central
bank interest rate changes directly inﬂuence mental health, nor whether this varies by levels of indebtedness.
Methods: We use British data (N =93,255) to explore whether the Bank of England base-rate aﬀected how
perceived burden of non-mortgage debt (low, medium, and high) inﬂuenced psychiatric morbidity. Psychiatric
morbidity was measured using the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12). Our primary outcome measure was
a binary indicator of “psychiatric caseness” (> 3 on a 0–12 scale). We also used the GHQ-12 as a continuous
measure of distress.
Results: When interest rates are high (low) there is an increased (decreased) risk of psychiatric morbidity only
among those with a high debt burden (b =0.026, p= 0.02). This result was robust to alternative explanations.
Thus a 1 percentage point base-rate increase is associated with a 2.6% increase that someone with a high debt
burden will experience psychiatric morbidity.
Limitations: Our study uses subjective indicators of debt burden. We were unable to determine the mechanism
behind our eﬀect.
Conclusions: Changes in central bank interest rates to meet economic objectives pose a threat to mental health.
Mental health support is needed for those in debt and central banks may need to consider how their decisions
inﬂuence population mental health.
1. Introduction
There is a strong link between problem debt and common mental
disorders at the individual level (Drentea, 2000; Reading and Reynolds,
2001). The extent to which debt is a problem often depends upon
personal factors, absolute level of debt, and income available to ﬁnance
the debt (Fitch et al., 2011). However, there are also major economic
policy decisions, outside of the control of the individual, which have the
potential to both alleviate and intensify the incidence of mental health
issues associated with debt. For example, ﬁscal policy, which is the
means by which a government inﬂuences the economy via adjusting tax
and spend levels, can inﬂuence the availability of mental health care
resources (Saxena et al., 2007) and protect those who may be the most
vulnerable to mental health issues (Lundin and Hemmingsson, 2009).
Monetary policy, which is the counterpart to ﬁscal policy and con-
ducted by central banks, inﬂuences the economy via controlling the
economy's money supply (Mankiw, 2009). A key monetary policy tool
for controlling the money supply is by changing the interest rate to
which debt must be repaid. Although there is a literature highlighting
important eﬀects of macroeconomic factors (Faresjö et al., 2013;
Katikireddi et al., 2012), there has been no research in assessing how
central bank interest rate decisions, determined exogenously to the
individual, might directly inﬂuence mental health.
The remit of a central bank is exclusively economic. For example,
the Bank of England's stated objective is”to maintain price stability – as
deﬁned by the Government's 2 percent inﬂation target – and, subject to that,
to support the Government's economic policies, including those for growth
and employment” (Bank of England, 2013). Although there may be
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indirect societal-wide beneﬁts to psychological health of having a stable
economy with low unemployment (Reeves et al., 2014; Stuckler et al.,
2009; Zivin et al., 2011) the tools that a central bank uses to achieve
these economic objectives may themselves pose a direct psychological
risk and this may in turn have an economic cost to society (see, Layard,
2006).
Central banks set the short-term interest rate – the base-rate – at
which private banks can lend money from the Bank of England. Private
banks then pass this interest rate change on to the wider economy via
the rate individuals pay on loans or receive from savings (George et al.,
1999). Based on previous literature there is good reason to suppose that
those who are more greatly burdened by their debt will have non-trivial
mental health reactions to changes in central bank interest rates. High
levels of debt burden may reﬂect a ‘moral stressor’ (Doehring, 2016)
where by“…one knows the right thing to do, but institutional con-
straints make it nearly impossible to pursue the right course of action"
(Jameton, 1984, p. 6). This reﬂects uncertainty about a person's ability
to fulﬁl their moral obligations (Reynolds et al., 2012), resulting in
feelings of shame and guilt (Hirdman, 2016; Jeong, 2016). All else
being equal, an external change in interest rates will aﬀect the debtor's
ability to manage their debt. However, a reduced sense of ability to
repay, if already feeling guilty or shamed, may push the debtor towards
social withdrawal and psychological distress. This may be especially the
case for those with higher levels of debt burden, who are more likely to
have lower self-eﬃcacy (Kuhen and Melzer, 2017). Those with low self-
eﬃcacy report high levels of psychological distress (Selenko and
Batinic, 2011) and seek less help for their debt (Lim et al., 2014) when
ﬁnancial stress is high (for example when interest rate changes aﬀect
the ability to repay). Furthermore, those with higher levels of debt
burden are more present orientated, and therefore less able to plan for
future changes (Webley and Nyhus, 2001). Thus, we hypothesise based
on this previous literature that interest rate changes will inﬂuence the
mental health of those with high debt burden.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
We examine our hypotheses using the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS), a randomly sampled longitudinal study of British
households (see Taylor et al., 2010, for sampling information). The
dataset includes 18 waves of data, beginning in September 1991, with
the last wave of data collection taking place in April 2009. We use 14
waves of the BHPS from September 1995 to April 2009 where questions
about debt and savings are available. In each wave of the BHPS the
heads of each household are ﬁrst interviewed to obtain household level
information. Next individuals in the household are interviewed to
gauge individual information, and then individuals are administered a
self-completion questionnaire. The self-completion questionnaire con-
tains questions relating to mental health. Since questions about debt are
asked at the household level we focus on individuals that indicate that
they are the head of their household and that were 18 or over. There
were a total of 104,593 observations across 16,953 individuals in-
dicating themselves as head of the household in the BHPS across this
time period. Thus the same individuals, although not necessarily in
every wave, are involved throughout the study. However, questions on
mental health (8.7%) and questions about debt and savings (7.2%) were
not answered in every year by every individual. Since these were our
key hypothesis variables we included in our analysis only those ob-
servations with non-missing values for these key independent variables.
This resulted in a sample that included 93,255 observations across
15,818 participants (34% female, age 18–100, M =50.57, SD
=17.72).
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Interest rates
Fig. 1 (left hand-section) shows that between September 1995 to
April 2009 the Bank of England base-rate ranged from 0.5% to 7.5%
and there were a total of 52 interest rate-periods (51 base-rate change
announcements). We match the Bank of England base-rate with the day
on which each individual was interviewed. Further, owing to either
short interest-rate periods or that there were no interviews taking place
from May to August some interest rate periods are matched to relatively
few or no individuals. However, since the interest rate on the day of an
individual's interview might not always represent the interest rate faced
by the individual across the entire year we also examine the average of
the Bank of England base-rate in the year up until the individual's in-
terview (previous year's base-rate average) as an alternative indicator of
interest rates.
Mental health was measured using the 12-item version of the General
Health Questionnaire across all 14 waves. Items in the GHQ-12 (e.g.,
"thinking of self as worthless”) are scored as follows: “not at all = 0”, “no
more than usual = 0”, “rather more than usual = 1”, or “much more than
usual = 1” (range =0–12). As a continuous measure this indicates
general increasing “psychological distress” (Goldberg and Williams,
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Fig. 1. The Bank of England base-rate (left hand vertical axis) and psychiatric caseness (top: right hand vertical axis, bottom: horizontal axis) among the heavily
indebted in the corresponding base-rate period from September 1995-April 2009. We calculated the proportion of individuals reaching the threshold for psychiatric
caseness/morbidity among persons that were heavily indebted across each of the 52 interest rate periods. In many cases there were insuﬃcient observations to ensure
reliable estimates of psychiatric caseness/morbidity among this group due to relatively few or no individuals being interviewed in that interest rate period (23
interest rate periods have 10 or less observations). We plotted for each interest rate period, where there were suﬃcient observations within each interest rate period
(n > 40), the incidence of psychiatric caseness/morbidity against the Bank of England base-rate (r=0.48, p < 0.05).
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1991). although we carry out an analysis using the continuous measure,
we also make use of the GHQ-12 as an indication of “psychiatric case-
ness”, whereby this is indicated by a score above a threshold according
to that set out in Goldberg et al. (1997) for various populations. The
binary version of the GHQ-12, however, is typically used for clinical
screening rather than a diagnostic tool and indicates psychiatric mor-
bidity.
Household debt position is determined by answers to questions re-
garding debt and savings. In each wave of the BHPS individuals are
asked: “Do you save any amount of your income for example by putting
something away now and then in a bank, building society, or Post Oﬃce
account other than to meet regular bills?” Individuals answer either yes or
no.
Individuals are also asked: “Do you or anyone in your household have
to make repayments on hire purchases or loans?” Individuals are speciﬁ-
cally asked not to include mortgage loans but to include Department of
Social Security (DSS) social fund loans. Individuals answer either yes or
no. Directly following this the individual is then asked “to what extent is
the repayment of such debts and the interest a ﬁnancial burden on your
household?” Individuals answered either “a heavy burden”, “somewhat of
a burden”, or “not a problem” for their household. From this question we
generated three dummy variables to indicate the extent to which debt,
if present, was a burden on the household.
Those that reported that their debt was “not a problem” scored 1.55
(SD=2.70, 95% CI: 1.51 – 1.59) on average using the GHQ-12 and had
a psychiatric caseness rate of 0.16 (SD =0.37, 95% CI: 0.16 – 0.17).
Those that reported that their debt was “somewhat of a problem”
scored 2.41 (SD =3.34, 95% CI: 2.33 – 2.48) on average using the
GHQ-12 and had a psychiatric caseness rate of 0.26 (SD =0.44, 95%
CI: 0.25 – 0.27). Those that reported that their debt was “a heavy
burden” scored 4.13 (SD=4.09, 95% CI: 3.98 – 4.23) on average using
the GHQ-12 and had a psychiatric caseness rate of 0.46 (SD =0.50,
95% CI: 0.44 – 0.48). ANOVA showed a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
each of the groups in the GHQ-12 (f = 662.28, p= 0.000, r2 = 0.02)
and the incidence of psychiatric caseness (f = 491.26, p= 0.000, r2
= 0.02).
We also calculated the proportion of individuals reaching the
threshold for psychiatric caseness among persons that were heavily
indebted across each of the 52 interest rate periods. In many cases there
were insuﬃcient observations to ensure reliable estimates of psychiatric
caseness among this group due to relatively few or no individuals being
interviewed in that interest rate period (23 interest rate periods have 10
or less observations). In Fig. 1 we plotted for each interest rate period,
where there were suﬃcient observations within each interest rate
period (n > 40), the incidence of psychiatric caseness against the Bank
of England base-rate (r=0.48, p < 0.05).
The subjective nature of the question on debt burden may draw
some concern. However, it has been suggested, for example, that ob-
jective indicators do not give a complete picture of the pressures of debt
as there are often factors that we cannot observe that may make debt a
problem (Keese, 2012). Further, there is also some concern that the
question itself, due to an explicit reference to interest, may prime in-
dividuals into thinking about the prevailing interest rate rather than the
burden of repaying their debt. Thus, it is possible that our key variable
acts only as an indication of an individual disliking interest rather than
the size of their debt. We, therefore, attempt an objective veriﬁcation of
our indicator of problem debt using self-reported level of debt and the
ratio of this debt to household income. In waves 5, 10, and 15 of the
BHPS individuals are asked whether they have any ﬁnancial commit-
ments apart from mortgages. Individuals are then asked how much to
the nearest pound sterling they owe on these commitments. Those who
“don’t know” are further asked in turn whether the amount is more than
£00, 100, £500, £1500, £5000, £10,000. After recoding each of the
categorical answers to the means of those who gave precise values of
their debt (e.g., the mean debt of those with between £100 and £500
was inputted for those who had more that £100 of debt but less than
£500) we then divided this amount of debt by household income to give
a debt to income ratio. Those who reported a heavy burden of debt had
an average debt of £6,122 (SD =9415, 95% CI: 5354 – 6890), re-
presenting a debt to household income ratio of 0.36 (SD =0.95, 95%
CI: 0.28–0.44), whereas those who reported debt was somewhat of a
burden had a mean debt of £ 4,578 (SD =7304, 95% CI: 4226 – 4930)
and a debt to household income ratio of 0.24 (SD =1.16, 95% CI: 0.19
– 0.30). Those who reported that debt was not a problem had a debt
level of £ 3,757 (SD=10,563, 95% CI: 3389–4126) with a ratio of 0.21
(SD =2.54, 95% CI: 0.12 – 0.30). ANOVA showed that there was a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the absolute levels of debt (f = 468.8,
p= 0.000, r2 = 0.07) and follow up t-tests showed that absolute levels
of debt in all categories were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other
(lowest t = 2.78, highest p=0.006). Since those that indicated they
had a higher debt burden also had higher objective debt we take this as
evidence of a reliable indicator of problem debt and that it is unlikely to
only indicate a dislike of interest rates.
2.2.2. Covariates
There are a number of factors that are likely to correlate with an
individual's household debt position and mental health. Thus we in-
clude in all our regressions a set of observable controls including edu-
cation level, marital status, household size and whether there were
children in the house, disability status, employment status, and log of
household income. There was missing data for some of these covariates.
Where there was missing data for categorical variables we included an
extra category to indicate those individuals who had missing data.
Where there were missing values for continuous variables; the log of
household income (0.4%), we imputed values using multiple imputa-
tion (Rubin, 2004). Table 1 gives descriptive statistics across the vari-
ables in our mental health sample.
We also included in all regressions time-period dummies to account
for national factors, such as macroeconomic conditions, that may have
simultaneously inﬂuenced both debt and mental health. Although there
is no strong reason to think that our eﬀect will be explained by mac-
roeconomic factors other than interest rates it is important to eliminate
these potential explanations. Thus in a later robustness test we include
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of household heads from the British Household Panel
Survey that answered both GHQ-12 questionnaire and answered the household
debt position variables (N = 93,255).
Variable
Mean (standard deviation)
GHQ-12 Psychiatric Caseness (0; 1): 0.20 (0.40)
GHQ-12 “bi-modal” Psychological distress: 1.90 (3.01)
Household debt position:
Savers 0.40
Debt not a problem 0.17
Debt somewhat of a burden 0.09
Heavy debt burden 0.03
Age 50.57 (17.72)
Female = 1 0.34
Marital Status:
Married = 1 0.49
Never married = 1 0.22
Widowed =1 0.13
Divorced = 1 0.13
Separated = 1 0.03
Household size 2.44 (1.32)
Has children = 1 0.30
Highest educational qualiﬁcation
GCSE = 1 0.26
A-level = 1 0.25
Degree = 1 0.14
Unemployed = 1 0.03
Retired = 1 0.25
Disabled = 1 0.11
Household income £25,420 (22,050)
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macroeconomic variables directly, as well as their interaction with our
household debt position variables. Speciﬁcally, we include unemploy-
ment rate in the month of the interview, regional house price growth in
the quarter of the interview, and inﬂation and GDP per capita growth
rate in the year of the interview.
2.3. Empirical speciﬁcation
We investigate how interest rates at the time of an individual's in-
terview relate to mental health, as indicated by scores om the GHQ-12
(caseness/morbidity or continuous), using the following model:
= + + +
+ + + + + ∑ +=
Mental Health β β r β Saver β Saver r
β Debt Burden Debt Burden r β x
*
* μ δ ε
it it it it it
it it it i t k
k
k kit it
0 1 2 3
4 1 
(1)
Where Debt Burden is the extent the individual thinks their debt is a
burden to their household and captured using dummy variables. Not a
problem, somewhat of a problem, a heavy burden, relative to those
with no debt.
Mental health for individual i at time t, depends on the interest rate
faced by an individual at the time of the interview, r. We expect the
eﬀect of the interest rate on individual mental health to be dependent
on a household's debt position. Thus we include indicators of whether
an individual saves, and the extent to which any unsecured debt, if they
have any, is a burden on their household as main eﬀect variables. We
also interact these variables with interest rates so as to determine
whether there are diﬀerences in how interest rates inﬂuence individuals
in each of these groups. Whilst we expect there may be some beneﬁt
when interest rates are high for savers (a positive coeﬃcient on the
interaction term for savers – β3Saver*r) and some detriment to those
with some debt we expect a high interest rate to be particularly detri-
mental for those with a heavy debt burden (i.e., a large negative
coeﬃcient on the interest rate-heavy burden interaction term).
There are a number of factors that may explain both debt and
mental health. This includes time-period factors that would be expected
to inﬂuence all individuals equally at any given time-period, δ, an array
of k observable characteristics x, and individual speciﬁc factors, µ. We
account for the time period factors, δ, by including dummy variables to
indicate the wave in which an individual's interview took place. We
control for observable characteristics, x, by including demographic and
socio-economic variables. Individual speciﬁc factors, µ, consist of po-
tential confounding aspects that are characteristic of the individual but
are unobservable, immeasurable, or simply unknown. Such baseline
individual diﬀerences might include, for example, people's perception
of how bad debt is, personality characteristics, self-eﬃcacy, and/or
ability to forward plan. Baseline levels of unobserved or unknown
variables are fully controlled for through estimation based on ex-
plaining the within-person variation relationship of the variables. Our
within-person estimation strategy fully exploits the longitudinal nature
of the data and minimises the possibility that unchanging individual
speciﬁc factors that are unobservable, immeasurable, or simply un-
known drive our results. Additionally, variables that are known but do
not vary across time, such as sex, are implicitly controlled for in the
analysis. Although the focus on within-person changes across time re-
sults in imprecise estimates on variables that do not have high within
person variation (Boyce, 2010) our approach does, since interest rates
are determined exogenously to the individual, enable a possible causal
interpretation (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). In our models any compo-
nents that remain unexplainable are assumed to be captured by an
idiosyncratic error term ε.
In all cases we assume linearity in our dependent variables. This
includes the psychiatric caseness/morbidity binary outcome variable
where we carry out an estimation using a linear probability model.
Since individuals and interest rates are measured at diﬀerent levels i.e.
we observe the same individuals across a number of time-points and
interest rates are the same within a given time-period for many in-
dividuals, the error terms are likely to be clustered. We account for
clustering for both levels of measurement by estimating 2 way standard
errors (Cameron and Miller, 2015). All analyses were carried out using
Stata 12.
3. Results
We ﬁrst examine the extent to which the Bank of England base-rate
on the day of an individual's survey interview predicts mental health.
We then examine whether using the average interest rate over the year
up until the individual's survey interview provide a better explanation.
Table 2 shows the results. Columns 1 and 2 show the results for psy-
chiatric caseness/morbidity and columns 3 and 4 show the results when
GHQ-12 is treated as a continuous measure. Across all analyses interest
rates are on average not linked to mental health. However, a con-
sideration of the interaction terms suggests that the inﬂuence of interest
rates on mental health depends on household debt position. We observe
that with increasing debt burden there is a tendency toward reduced
mental health when interest rates are high. In particular, for those that
experience debt as a heavy burden there is a negative eﬀect on mental
health when interest rates are high. We note, however, that none of the
main eﬀects on our savings or debt burden variables are signiﬁcant.
Table 2
The Inﬂuence of the Bank of England Base-Rate on Mental Health Moderated by
Household Debt Position in the British Household Panel Survey (N =93,255).
Dependent variables: Independent variable:
Psychiatric Caseness/
morbidity (0; 1)
GHQ-12 “continuous”
(0–12)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interest rate −0.002 −0.011 −0.031 −0.051
(0.005) (0.011) (0.031) (0.079)
Saver −0.003 −0.005 −0.108 −0.107
(0.011) (0.014) (0.090) (0.103)
Interest rate*Saver −0.003 −0.002 −0.008 −0.008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.018) (0.019)
Debt not a problem 0.012 0.024 0.097 −0.116
(0.018) (0.019) (0.126) (0.131)
Interest rate*Debt not a
problem
−0.004 −0.006† −0.037 −0.040
(0.004) (0.004) (0.025) (0.024)
Somewhat of a debt
burden
0.021 −0.001 0.336* 0.184
(0.022) (0.027) (0.168) (0.196)
Interest rate*Somewhat
of a debt burden
−0.001 0.003 −0.029 0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.030) (0.037)
Heavy debt burden −0.002 −0.035 0.001 −0.321
(0.045) (0.053) (0.283) (0.400)
Interest rate*Heavy debt
burden
0.020** 0.026** 0.169** 0.228**
(0.008) (0.010) (0.049) (0.074)
Constant 0.132 0.165 1.259 1.262
(0.208) (0.212) (1.811) (1.777)
Interest rate variable Day of
interview
Year
Average
Day of
interview
Year
Average
Controls for
macroeconomic
interaction eﬀects
No No No No
Observations 93,255 93,255 93,255 93,255
Number of individuals 15,818 15,818 15,818 15,818
Notes: All regressions include controls for demographic and socio-economic
circumstances (education level, marital status, occupational status, household
size and whether there were children in the house, disability status, and log of
household income), individual speciﬁc factors (by assessing within-person
variation), and time-period eﬀects (including time-period dummies). In
Regressions 1 and 3 we estimate robust standard errors that account for non-
nested clustering at both the individual level and the interest rate period in
which individuals were interviewed.
** p < 0.01.
* p < 0.05.
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Given that we observed strong cross-sectional diﬀerences between
mental health and our debt burden variables as highlighted in our
Methods section this may draw some concern. However, this is likely to
arise in part because our estimation strategy, which focuses exclusively
on within-person variation and, therefore, allows a possible causal in-
terpretation, is known to produce imprecise estimates on variables that
do not vary much within individuals (Boyce, 2010). Since our savings
and debt burden variables vary little over time for each individual re-
lative to the variation across individuals this explains this eﬀect.
Results from the linear probability regression using the average
interest rate over the previous year in column 2 suggest that a one
percentage point increase in the base-rate is linked to a 2.6% increase in
the likelihood that someone with a heavy debt burden will experience
psychiatric morbidity. If we were to consider an interest rate movement
of 4 percentage points (93% of the observations in our sample experi-
enced interest rates between 3.5% and 7.5%) this would increase the
relative risk of someone with a heavy debt burden by 10.4%.2 Although
these eﬀects might be considered small (between 0.05 and 0.10 of a
standard deviation) given that our analyses are based on within-person
changes and interest rate changes are exogenous to the individual our
results have a possible causal interpretation (Angrist and Pischke,
2008).
3.1. Alternative macroeconomic explanations
An alternative explanation of our result is that this eﬀect is driven
by other macroeconomic variables correlated with the Bank of England
base-rate. Over the time period of our study as average interest rates in
the previous year correlates with monthly unemployment rate (r=
0.58), yearly inﬂation rate (r=0.06), yearly GDP per capita growth
rate (r= − 0.21), and quarterly house price growth (r= 0.18). To
account for these alternative explanations, we include the unemploy-
ment rate in the month of the interview, regional house price growth in
the quarter of the interview, and inﬂation and GDP per capita growth
rate in the year of the interview as additional explanatory variables, as
well as their interactions with the household debt position variables –
savers and debt burden. The results using average interest rates are
found in Table 3 and show our results are robust to these alternative
explanations. Further, since there were substantial macroeconomic
changes, which included dramatic Bank of England base-rate decreases,
in the ﬁnal wave of our data we also re-ran our analyses excluding the
ﬁnal wave. The results were consistent with our main analyses.
4. Discussion
Our research is the ﬁrst to illustrate that monetary policy decisions,
via changes in interest rates, can have direct implications for mental
health. Our analyses revealed, as hypothesised, that when economy-
wide interest rates are high (low) there is an increased (decreased) risk
of lower mental health among the heavily indebted. Since interest rates
are determined primarily by factors exogenous to the individual and we
examined within-person changes our results have a possible causal in-
terpretation, with a one percentage point increase in the Bank of
England base-rate increasing the risk of psychiatric caseness/morbidity
by at least 2.6% among those heavily indebted.
Governments, policymakers, and mental health practitioners need
to be aware of the implications that monetary policy decisions may
have on mental health. Access to credit is an important aspect of
modern society and may help individuals invest in their future, but
debt, which is at present at historically high levels, may become
unsustainable. Low interest rates may be useful for increasing invest-
ment and therefore boosting a country's economy but low rates also
encourage the uptake of more personal debt (Gross and Souleles, 2002).
When interest rates are low high debt may be serviceable but as these
rates rise high levels of debt may become unmanageable and put many
people's mental health at risk. Although those heavily indebted re-
presented only 2.9% of observations in our sample this suggests that in
a country, such as the UK, where there are 26.4 million households, we
would expect there to be approximately 800,000 households with a
heavy debt burden. Our ﬁnding of a marginal eﬀect of 2.6% increase in
psychiatric caseness/morbidity with each percentage point increase in
interest rates (if only the household heads were aﬀected) suggests there
would be approximately 20,000 additional cases of psychiatric case-
ness/morbidity. The cost to society of one individual with psychiatric
morbidity has been estimated to be at least £7,880 (Layard, 2006) and
therefore an overall societal cost of each percentage point increase
would be £156 million. Although it is important central banks maintain
economic objectives, which may indirectly beneﬁt mental health, there
is a case for central banks to consider direct welfare implications of
their decisions. There is also a strong public health case to intervene
before mental health reaches crisis levels as a result of high indebted-
ness.
Economy-wide interest rate changes, however, are not the only
monetary tool that central banks can use to inﬂuence the economy
Table 3
The Inﬂuence of the Bank of England Base-Rate on Mental Health Moderated by
Household Debt Position Accounting for Alternative Macro-Economic
Explanations.
Dependent variables: Independent variable:
Psychiatric Caseness/
morbidity (0; 1)
GHQ-12 “continuous”
(0–12)
(1) (2)
Interest rate −0.014 −0.099
(0.012) (0.085)
Saver −0.018 −0.150
(0.020) (0.145)
Interest rate*Saver −0.001 0.004
(0.004) (0.027)
Debt not a problem −0.034 0.087
(0.025) (0.178)
Interest rate*Debt not a
problem
−0.013** −0.091**
(0.005) (0.051)
Somewhat of a debt burden 0.015 0.435
(0.037) (0.267)
Interest rate*Somewhat of a
debt burden
−0.003 −0.003
(0.007) (0.055)
Heavy debt burden −0.044 −0.352
(0.070) (0.541)
Interest rate*Heavy debt burden 0.030* 0.261*
(0.014) (0.104)
Constant 0.361 3.198†
(0.243) (1.923)
Interest rate variable Year Average Year Average
Controls for macroeconomic
interaction eﬀects
Yes Yes
Observations 93,255 93,255
Number of individuals 15,818 15,818
Notes: All regressions include controls for demographic and socio-economic
circumstances (education level, marital status, occupational status, household
size and whether there were children in the house, disability status, and log of
household income), individual speciﬁc factors (by assessing within-person
variation), and time-period eﬀects (including time-period dummies), macro-
economic interactions (monthly unemployment rate, regional quarterly house
price growth, inﬂation, and GDP per capita growth rate as main eﬀect variables
and interactions with household debt position). We estimate robust standard
errors at the individual level.
** p < 0.01.
* p < 0.05.
2 We explored diﬀerent thresholds for psychiatric caseness. In our sample when we
selected a cut-oﬀ of> 2 the incidence rate was 26%, whereas a cut-oﬀ of> 4 gave an
incidence rate of 16%. When we analysed our data using these alternate thresholds the
coeﬃcients on the heavy debt were statistically signiﬁcant for both a cut-oﬀ> 2 (b
= 0.033) and a cut-oﬀ> 4 (b = 0.020).
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(Joyce et al., 2011). Quantitative easing (Joyce et al., 2011) is another
strategy that attempts to increase demand in an economy through di-
rectly increasing the money supply. Some have suggested that a better
way to improve the economy would be to give individuals money in the
form of a debt jubilee (Keen, 2011). To the extent that such a debt
jubilee would decrease individual debt burden, and therefore the risk of
psychiatric morbidity, our study supports such an approach.
Our study is not without limitations. We cannot be completely
certain as to the extent to which the Bank of England base-rate trans-
lates to market rates. Although the transmission mechanism is almost
immediate (George et al., 1999) we are unable to know the exact rates
paid by individuals on their debt. For example, those with problem debt
may only have access to loans with particularly high rates. However,
whilst rates may diﬀer across speciﬁc types of debt we believe that Bank
of England base-rate will act as a good proxy for changes across dif-
ferent markets. A further issue is that we do not know the exact me-
chanism by which interest rate changes inﬂuenced an individual's
mental health. For example, it is not clear whether people are explicitly
aware of the interest rate changes. Thus any eﬀect could have been via
direct impacts on an individual's debt repayments or rather through
anticipatory eﬀects about future debt repayments due to individuals
following Bank of England base-rate decisions and concerns for the
future economy. This may be individual speciﬁc and driven by per-
sonality characteristics (see, e.g., Boyce et al., 2016). However, since
our results were stronger using the Bank of England base-rate experi-
enced over the previous year we suspect it is more likely the former.
Perhaps a useful avenue for future research in exploring these me-
chanisms would be to explore objective ﬁnance related behaviour. It is
also likely that people may vary considerably in their levels of debt
between measurement points. We were unable to account for potential
debt variation but this would be an interesting area to explore. Our
study also only focused on non-mortgage debt. Mortgage debt is an
important part of household debt, which can often be the most bur-
densome. There are several reasons why we did not include mortgage
debt. First, the dataset did not contain an appropriate variable that
would have enabled us to investigate the importance of mortgage debt
(for example, the size of the mortgage debt was unknown and there was
no indication as to the burden it placed on the household). Second, a
large proportion of the mortgage debt in the UK is based on ﬁxed in-
terest rates and therefore would not be expected to be inﬂuenced.
Further, we did not have information as to whether a household's
mortgage was ﬁxed or variable. Third, mortgage debt is secured against
the property and we wanted to focus on unsecured debt, which has
diﬀerent consequences if not repaid. The extent to which a household
found their unsecured debt a burden would have depended on other
expenditures, which may have included mortgage debt. We believe it
likely that were a household ﬁnding their mortgage debt a heavy
burden then they would have also indicted that their unsecured debt
would be a heavy burden. Nevertheless, this is a limitation of our study
and an issue to address in future research. Although we objectively
validated our subjective indicators of debt we cannot rule out the
possibility that those with mental health issues may experience debt as
burdensome at levels that are relatively low. Nevertheless, our study is
the ﬁrst of its kind in demonstrating a direct pathway by which central
bank monetary policy decisions inﬂuence the prevalence of psychiatric
caseness/morbidity. Now that this initial demonstration has been made
we recommend that future research try to examine mechanistic path-
ways and overcome some of these limitations by exploring, for example,
objective indicators of debt burden and by examining debt speciﬁc in-
terest rates.
While others have begun to show that central banks decisions might
inﬂuence psychological health indirectly (Blanchﬂower et al., 2014) we
are the ﬁrst to show a direct pathway to mental health. Our work
therefore ﬁts with the literature highlighting the stressful eﬀects of
adverse macroeconomic conditions (Faresjö et al., 2013; Katikireddi
et al., 2012). More generally there is a growing interest in using non-
economic indicators to guide policy (Stiglitz et al., 2009) and it has
been suggested that central banks should also explicitly target psy-
chological factors (Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2009). Our research oﬀers
further support for this perspective.
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